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EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS-ALTERNATIVES TO THE
PROPRIETARY OPTION DOCTRINE*
CASE AND REGULATION HISTORY
Stock options have found wide usage since the close of World
War I as a means of compensating and granting proprietary in-
terests to key employees. Corporations and executives had by the
early 1920's become keenly aware of the tax advantages inherent in
the use of these stock options. Appropriately, it was at this time that
the Treasury took its initial action on the subject whereby it rec-
ognized only compensatory stock options. The policy was enunciated
in a Treasury Decision' which required the inclusion in gross income
of the difference between cost and fair market value of any property
sold by a corporation to a shareholder. The courts did not readily
accept the Treasury's policy with regard to all transfers between cor-
porations and shareholders This reluctance to apply the Treasury's
policy with full force extended to cases involving a corporation's own
stock.' The courts in the early cases did not express their decisions
in terms of proprietorship or compensation, but spoke rather in
terms of bargain and purchase.' In all cases, however, the courts,
where appropriate, were careful to point out that the purpose
of the option was to make the executive a stockholder rather than to
compensate him. It remained for the courts at a later date to articulate
the proprietary interests doctrine as the real reason behind their
decisions.' In 1939 the Treasury issued T.D. 4879 in which it
acceded to judicial holdings, and stated that the excess value of prop-
erty transferred over the purchase price is includible in gross income
* ED. NOTE: See also the Leading Article in this issue by Tom B. Rhodes, Unrestricted
Stock Options. The Leading Article and this Comment constitute a complementary pre-
sentation of the subject of stock options in their various aspects. The two views expressed
cover somewhat different areas of the same problem and should be read together for a
more comprehensive coverage of the field.1 T.D. 3435, 11-1 CUM. BULL. 50 (1923).
'Commissioner v. Van Vorst. 59 F. 2d 677 (9th Cir. 1932); Taplin v. Commissioner,
41 F. 2d 454 (6th Cir. 1930); see also cases cited note 3 infra.
'Rossheim v. Commissioner, 92 F. 2d 247 (3d Cir. 1937); Omaha-National Bank v.
Commissioner, 75 F. 2d 434 (8th Cir. 1935); Schaefer v. Bowers, 41 F. 2d 803 (S.D.N.Y.
1930); Charles E. Adams, 39 B.T.A. 387 (1939); Gordon M. Evans, 38 B.T.A. 1406
(1938); Delbert G. Geeseman, 38 B.T.A. 258 (1938).
' Cases cited note 3 supra.
5Commissioner v. LoBue, 223 F. 2d 367 (3d Cir. 1955), rev'd, 351 U.S. 243 (1956);
Commissioner v. Straus, 208 F. 2d 325 (7th Cir. 1953); Abraham Rosenberg, 20 T.C. s
(1953).
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to the extent that it is "in the nature of compensation for services
rendered or to be rendered. . .. "'
In 1945 the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Commissioner
v. Smith7 sustaining the Tax Court in its finding that a stock option
was received by taxpayer as compensation for services. The decision
was in line with previous judicial authority and the current regula-
tion, and held that the grant of the options, on the facts, was in the
nature of compensation. As a result of the Smith case, T.D. 5507'
was promulgated by the Treasury and became effective the day the
Smith decision was rendered. It dictated that "the difference between
the amount paid for the property and the amount of its fair market
value is in the nature of compensation and shall be included in the
gross income of the employee."' (Italics added) This precluded the
possibility of a proprietary option and precipitated a spontaneous
burst of protest that the Treasury had, in T.D. 5507, gone beyond
the holdings and facts in the Smith case.'" The question whether the
regulation would be upheld in the face of prior contrary judicial
decisions appeared to be a valid one. For several years after issuance
of T.D. 5507 the courts were involved only with options granted
prior to February 26, 1946. In these cases the courts continued to
hold that such options were not necessarily to be taxed as compensa-
tion," but did not decide the collateral issue of the validity of the
regulations under T.D. 5507.
THE LOBUE CASE
Eight years later, in 1954, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
and a taxpayer named LoBue contested the basic validity of the
Treasury's position. Taxpayer was granted options in 1945, 1946 and
1947 (the first two options were granted before the effective date
of T.D. 5507). Though new options were granted in each year, they
were all at the price established in 1945 which was above the then
market value but below that of subsequent years. I.T. 379512 issued
pursuant to T.D. 5507 provided that options granted before February
26, 1946, would not be subject to T.D. 5507 if they were granted
" 1939-1, CUM. BULL. 159.
7324 U.S. 177 (1945).
8 1946, CUM. BULL. 18, amending U.S. Treas. Regs. 111, § 29.22(a)-1 (1946).
9 See note 8 supra.
10E.g., Landman, Executive Stock Options, 31 TAXEs 735 (1953); Seghers, Stock Pur-
chase Options and the New T.D. 5507. 41 N.Y. CERT. PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 250 (1946).
"Commissioner v. Straus, 208 F. 2d 325 (7th Cir. 1953); Abraham Rosenberg, 20 T.C.
5 (1953); Norman G. Nicolson, 13 T.C. 690 (1949).
12 1946, CUM. BULL. 15, amending U.S. Treas. Regs. 111, § 29.22(a)-i (1946).
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at prices not substantially below the then fair market value of the
stock. The Commissioner thus contended that the options granted
in 1946 and 1947 must be treated as compensatory options in ac-
cordance with I.T. 3795 and T.D. 5507, respectively, without a
factual determination of whether the options were granted as com-
pensation.
In the first decision rendered squarely on point, the Tax Court
held that the language of the Smith case did not support the amend-
ment to the regulations, and that the question of "whether a stock
option is granted to an employee as additional compensation, or to
give him a proprietary interest in the corporation, thus remains a
question of fact.""3 As a matter of fact the court found that the
option in this instance was given for a proprietary interest and was
not compensatory in nature. In the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, the Commissioner dropped his contention that T.D. 5507 was
supported by the decision in the Smith case and argued tliat the
amendment did not go beyond §22 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939."4 The court declined to accept the Commissioner's
position, stating that it felt the 1939 regulation and not the 1946 one
was in accord with the statute. The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari'" "to consider whether the Tax Court and the Court of
Appeals had given §22 (a) too narrow an interpretation.we
The Supreme Court did not choose to make a frontal attack on the
proprietary doctrine of stock options. Rather it chose to eliminate
the possibility of a proprietary interest by ascribing to §22 (a) a
sweeping coverage of "all gains" as gross income excepting only those
specifically exempted, none of which were appropriate to this case.
The Court dichotomized all transfers between corporate employer
and employee into either an "arm's length transaction between
strangers" on the one hand or a transfer of compensation on the other.
It must be one of these two, the Court reasoned, for there are no
other alternatives under §22 (a). Thus, with apparent ease, and for the
first time in a quarter of a century, a court stated that all option
bargainsgiven to employees are compensation.
The Court did not consider that §22 (a) defines gross income as
regains, profits, and income derived from .. .compensation for per-
sonal service. . ." (italics added) and that if the alleged compensa-
tion were in fact "gains" or "profits" rather than compensation it
"Philip J. LoBue, 22 T.C. 440, 444 (1954).
14 53 STAT. 9.
"Commissioner v. LoBue, 350 U.S. 893 (1955).
"6Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956).
(Vol. I11
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would not be necessary to search the exemptions to arrive at the
result desired by taxpayer. This result would be provided for in the
sections relating to capital gains. The Court stated that "there is not
a word in §22 (a) which indicates that its broad coverage should be
narrowed because of an employer's intention to enlist more efficient
service from his employees by making them part proprietors of his
business."'" Obviously if the alleged compensation is included in
gains or profits, even at a later date, from sales of stock reflecting as
a basis the option price paid for the stock, then the statutory def-
inition of gross income is not being narrowed in any sense.
The big question then is, should the difference between the option
price and the fair market value come under the "gains" or "profits"
provision of §22 (a)? The very basis of the employer-employee re-
lationship is that of payment for work done or to be done. Though
§22 (a) has been interpreted as not requiring a legal obligation where
the consideration is past," it has never been interpreted, to the
writer's knowledge, as negating the requirement that the compensa-
tion be given for some service of the employee, past, present or future.
What, then, is the option bargain given for in terms of personal ser-
vice and what type of service is rendered by the employee in return
for this bargain?" The answer in a strong factual case would seem to
be that the bargain is given for nothing in the way of personal ser-
vices, and that no personal services are rendered in return for the
option. It can hardly be denied that the immediate purpose of the
option is to induce the employee to acquire the stock. Certainly the
acquisition of stock is not a personal service. Factual cases would seem
l" Commissioner v. LoBue, supra note 16, at 247.
"8 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Poorman v. Commis-
sioner, 131 F. 2d 946 (9th Cir. 1942); Bass v. Hawley, 62 F. 2d 721 (5th Cir. 1933);
Weagant v. Bowers. 57 F. 2d 679 (2d Cir. 1932).
"In Charles E. Adams, 39 B.T.A. 387 (1939). the court said that the stock option,
though expressly subject to cancellation by corporation, was not in fact subject to an arbi-
trary withdrawal. Traditionally an option has been termed "a contract to keep an offer
open" as in Warner Bros. Theatres v. Proffitt, 32 Pa. 316, 198 Atl. 56 (1938). From these
cases it might be reasoned that an executive stock option is in fact a contract which is
binding, that if it is binding there is mutual consideration, and that if there is mutual con-
sideration, the option must be given for some service of the employee.
To the writer this is a non sequitur. Where an option is granted voluntarily by an em-
ployer other than in an employment contract, it would seem that this is a mere promise by
the employer and is revocable at that time. At some point, after the executive has expended
efforts in reliance upon the promise, the promise itself becomes irrevocable. See RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS S 90 (1932). The fact that the option becomes irrevocable does not
supply the missing for. The basic objective of granting the option has not changed. It was
a promise by which the corporation sought an ultimate benefit. The fact that the corpora-
tion, because of the executive's change of position, is estopped to revoke its promise still
does not mean that the promise was given for the change of position. The purpose of the
option remains primarily that of fostering ownership. The fact that employee rights attach
in the meantime i's wholly irrelevant.
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to exist where the option is not granted for past or present services.
What of the contention that the option is given, as phrased by the
Supreme Court in this case, "to secure better services," in the future?
Admittedly the option is given with the hope that it will result in
increased incentive, but it is not given with the idea that the in-
creased incentive will be in return for that option. ° The option
bargain is a means to an end. It does by a "proprietary interest in
fact" what mere compensation for personal services cannot do. It in-
creases incentive. To say that the option is compensation for the in-
creased incentive is to ignore the purpose and reason behind stock
ownership. It is contemplated by the company that the increased
effort will be born of the desire of the employee to increase his in-
come from stock ownership. This is the heart and core of the doctrine
of proprietary interest which has been recognized by the Tax Court2'
and courts of appeals" for many years, and which has never been
contradicted by contrary Congressional action."a This interpretation
" Compare Helvering v. American Dental, 318 U.S. 322 at 331 (1943), where the
court said "the fact that the motives leading to the cancellations were those of business or
even selfish ... is not significant" in determining whether a gift had been made to a
customer.
21Philip J. LoBue, 22 T.C. 440 (1954); Abraham Rosenberg, 20 T.C. 5 (1953);
Norman G. Nicolson, 13 T.C. 690 (1949); Herbert H. Springford, 41 B.T.A. 1001 (1940);
Charles E. Adams, 39 B.T.A. 387 (1939); Gordon M. Evans, 38 B.T.A. 1406 (1938);
Delbert G. Gesseman, 38 B.T.A. 258 (1938).
"Commissioner v. LoBue, 223 F. 2d 367 (3d Cir. 1955); Commissioner v. Straus, 208
F. 2d 325 (7th Cir. 1953); Rossheim v. Commissioner, 92 F. 2d 247 (3d Cir. 1937);
Merhengood Corporation v. Helvering, 89 F. 2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
saA review of the Senate's report on § 130A of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 casts some
doubt as to the real intent behind its passage. The following passages from the report, S.
REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1950), are pertinent:
At the present time the taxation of these options is governed by regulations which
impede the use of the employee stock option for incentive purposes. Moreover, your
committee believes these regulations go beyond the decision of the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945). The resulting uncertainty as to whether
these regulations are in accordance with the law is an additional reason for legislative
action at the present time ....
Under your committee's bill no tax will be imposed at the time of exercise of a
"restricted stock option" or at the time the option is granted and the gain realized
by the sale of the stock acquired through the exercise of the option will be taxed as
a long term capital gain. Such treatment is limited to the "restricted stock option"
for the purpose of excluding cases where the option is not a true incentive device.
Options which do not qualify as "restricted stock options" will continue to be taxed
as under existing law. (Italics added)
The doubt reflected in the quoted passages above as to the validity of T.D. 5507 appears
to be one of the moving factors behind the passage of the "restricted stock option" legisla-
tion. The italicized words in the second quoted paragraph indicate that the beneficial treat-
ment is given to none except qualifying options because it is desired not to include com-
pensatory options any further. An inspection will reveal that there is no limitation even on
compensatory options which qualify. The cited purpose of the limitation would seem to
indicate that incentive type or proprietary type options should still be accorded capital gain
treatment. Indeed, no other meaning would appear warranted from the statement that non-
qualifying options "will continue to be taxed as under existing law," proprietary options
being recognized under the law existing at that time.
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of proprietary interests does no violence to §22 (a). That section does
not require that income be ordinary income rather than capital gains,
nor current income rather than deferred until sale of stock. It only
requires that at some time such a benefit as is here bestowed be
recognized. The section is broad in this respect. The proprietary in-
terest concept does nothing to narrow it. For some reason the Supreme
Court seems to think it does and bases its decision upon that ground.
Whether the Supreme Court's decision in the LoBue case is good law
or not, it is nevertheless the law at this juncture. The LoBue doctrine
must, henceforth, fit into the tax planner's scheme, and his attention
must be directed to its limitations and alternatives.
RESTRICTED STOCK OPTIONs-AN ALTERNATIVE
The first question raised with respect to restricted stock options as
an alternative is, are they really an alternative? The Senate Finance
Committee in its report on restricted stock options stated, "Ordin-
arily when an option is used as an incentive device, the option price
approximates the fair market value of the stock at the time the
option is granted." 4 The committee's observation is correct. In the
majority of cases where courts have held options to be capital or
proprietary in nature, the fair market value at the time of the grant
approximated the option price. 5 One must not too readily conclude
from this similarity that restricted stock options will fulfill the calling
of proprietary options as used before the LoBue decision, however.
The statutory options are hedged in with restrictions such as stock
ownership and date of exercise and many other disadvantages which
render a thorough review of all circumstances and alternatives im-
perative for the prudent selection of a system of executive stock
ownership. This Comment can do no more than point up the problem
and suggest some areas for consideration.
In view of the turbulent history of executive compensation and
its taxation in the last thirty five years, it is perhaps a discrete move
to seek the shelter of a statute in the hope of obtaining certainty of
treatment for stock options granted key employees. This move can-
not, of course, be finally judged sound unless it meets the need
24 S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59, 60 (1950).
"SCommissioner v. Straus. 208 F. 2d 325 (7th Cir. 1953); Rossheim v. Commissioner,
92 F. 2d 247 (3d Cir. 1937); Philip J. LoBue, 22 T.C. 440 (1954), aff'd, 223 F. 2d 367
(3d Cir. 1955), rev'd, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Abraham Rosenberg, 20 T.C. 5 (1953);
Norman G. Nicolson, 13 T.C. 690 (1949); Herbert H. Springford, 41 B.T.A. 1001 (1940);
Charles E. Adams, 39 B.T.A. 387 (1939); Gordon M. Evans, 38 B.T.A. 1406 (1938). One
case where the option was below the fair market value of the 'stock was Delbert G. Geese-
man, 38 B.T.A. 258 (1938).
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of the corporation concerned in the most economic manner avail-
able. The use of restricted stock options under §421 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 is such a move. Statutory options can be
used most ideally by a corporation whose stock has a readily ascer-
tainable market value at a time when its stock is low or moderately
priced, whose future appears promising, when granted to executives
other than large stockholders and which executives have fairly sub-
stantial income subject to tax. From this optimum situation, the
gradations of usfulness of statutory options diminish to the point
where they are less beneficial than regular compensatory options (in-
cluding those formerly termed proprietary). A corporation operating
under all or most of the circumstances above will do well to give
serious consideration to the use of statutory options. Such a corpora-
tion can easily adapt its option price to conform with either the
85 % or 95 % of market value limitation as desired. The presence of a
depressed market gives it additional flavor because of the lure of
capital rather than ordinary income treatment of future market in-
creases. The fact that the executive is in a high income bracket makes
the exemption from taxation of the option-market spread relatively
more valuable to him than the deduction for compensation would be
to the corporation.
Probably the greatest restriction upon the use of the statutory
option is the requirement that the option price must be a certain per-
cent of the fair market value of the stock at date of grant. The
vast majority of corporations in this country are not listed on a stock
exchange, and the greater number are not traded with sufficient
frequency over-the-counter to establish a reliable market value. It is
thus inevitable that a market value must be established by evidence
of isolated sales, book value, earning power and other facts of pro-
bative value." In spite of the corporation's objective efforts to set the
option price at market values the road is open for evidence of higher
market value from the Commissioner. Obviously the uncertainty of
such a course is a strong deterrent to the use of statutory options
where the tax benefits of such options are the primary reason for
their use. It is believed, however, that a conservative application of
generally accepted standards of valuation in an objective spirit will
not be lightly considered by the court where it is obvious that an
honest effort was made by the corporation to comply with the
statute. The court should be reminded of the patent injustice to small
21 Compare use of formula based on earnings as described in Robertson v. Routzahn, 75
F. 2d 537 (6th Cir. 1935), and A.R.M. 34, 2 CuM. BULL. 31 (1920).
(Vol. 11
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corporations of exacting and after-the-fact determinations of market
value which thwart them in their bona fide attempt to comply with
the statute, especially where reasonable men might differ on such
a determination..
For companies with listed stocks and readily ascertainable market
values, the statutory option presents an opportunity undoubtedly out
of line with the basic purpose behind such options. In view of the
fact that the statute permits option prices to be as low as 85% of
the fair market value of the stock, it is clear that a system of de-
ferred compensation can be effected quite readily. The grant can
be made effective as of a date to be set by an appointed committee
at 85% of the price set by such committee. The committee can
simultaneously purchase stock at market on the exchange and set the
option price at 85 % of cost. The effect of such transaction is to com-
pensate the executive to the extent of 15% of the market value,
which compensation will not be recognized until its realization by
sale at some future date when lower tax rates are enjoyed by the
executive. This morsel is not so delectable as it first appears in view
of the fact that the corporation loses the right to take a deduction
for the amount of compensation so granted either in the year of the
grant or the year of recognition by the recipient. It becomes im-
portant to consider whether the tax benefit to the executive more
than balances the tax loss to the corporation. If the effect of the
double taxation of corporate earnings is weighed, it is quite conceiv-
able that what appeared to be a tax plum is little more than an
illusion.
A slight variation might make the statutory option more attractive.
If the committee grants the option at 95 % of market value, the 5%
spread will be taxed at capital gain rates rather than compensation
rates upon realization. This arrangement would require three times
as large a volume of financing as the 15% spread. If, however, the
corporation is able, under state law, to finance its own executives'
purchase, the corporate dividends will probably exceed the corporate
interest rate, and the larger volume of financing will not be an in-
superable burden.
The illusionary aspect of restricted stock options is perhaps best
presented by the use of hypothetical situations. The relative advantage
or disadvantage of statutory options is measured in the following
illustrations by the combined dollar benefits to both the corporation
and the executive. In a few circumstances, the relation between cor-
poration and executive might render the unilateral rather than the
1957)
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consolidated effect a more desirable and expedient criterion. Using
the combined effect as our standard, three principal variables must
be determined.
The first variable, in question form, is "At what price will the
option be exercised?" The second is "What will the differential in
the executive's tax rate be between the date of exercise and the date
of disposition or sale?" The third variable is presented in the question
"What percentage price option is being considered as an alternative
to the statutory option?"
The following situations illustrate the effect of these variables:
Situation 1-Smith who files a joint return, has $20,000 taxable in-
come and is given a 75% option to purchase for $3,750 stock with a
market value of $5,000. Jones, who also files a joint return and has
the same taxable income, is offered an 85 % restricted stock option.
He can buy for $4,250 stock worth $5,000. Both immediately exercise
their options, acquire stock worth $5,000. Later when their taxable
income is still $20,000 they sell the stock for $7,000.Y7
Situation 2-Same as situation 1 except that Smith and Jones both
exercise the option at a time when the stock is selling for $7,000, and
subsequently sell it for $7,000.
Situations 3 and 4-Same, respectively, as situations 1 and 2 except
that both executives have a taxable income of $40,000-in year of
exercise and year of sale.
Situation 5 and 6-Same, respectively, as situations 1 and 2 except
that Smith's option is granted at 65% rather than 75% of market
value at date of grant.
Situations 7 and 8-Same, respectively, as situations 5 and 6 except
that both executives had a taxable income of $40,000 at date ot
exercise and date of sale.
Situations 9 and 10-Same, respectively, as situations 1 and 2 except
that both executives had a taxable income in year of exercise ot
$64,000 and a taxable income in year of sale of $8,000.
Situations 11 and 12-Same, respectively, as situations 5 and 6 except
that both executives had a taxable income at date of exercise of
$64,000 and a taxable income in the year of sale of $8,000.
The above situations can be tested on the following basis to deter-
mine which method will result in a lower combined cost:
27This fact situation was used by J. K. Lasser in the June 15, 1956 special supplement






Value of stock at date of grant ----------------------- $5,000 $5,000
Option price received ------------------------ 3,750 4,250
Tax deduction value of spread (52% rate) -------- 650 -0-
Value received by corporation --..........---------------- 4,400 4,250
Net cost to corporation ------.-.....................---------- 600 750
COST TO EXECUTIVE:
Purchase price of stock ---------------------- 3,750 4,250
Tax on spread of $1,250 at 38% ---------------- 475 -0-
Capital gain tax on subsequent sale
38% X 50% of $7,000 less $5,000 ------------..... 380 380
Ordinary income tax on subsequent sale
$5,000 less basis X 38% ----------------------------------------- 0- 285
Net cost to executive ------------------------ 4,605 4,915
NET CONSOLIDATED COST --------------- $5,205 $5,665
Situations 2 through 12 tested on the above basis give the following
net consolidated costs:
SITUATION SMITH JONES EXCESS COST OF
R.S.O. OVER NON-
QUALIFYING S.O.
2 $4,545.00 $5,665.00 $1,120.00
3 5,610.00 5,980.00 370.00
4 ----------------- 5,130,00 5,980.00 850.00
5 5,135.00 5,665.00 530.00
6 ----------------- 4,475.00 5,665.00 1,190.00
7 --------------- 5,630.00 5,980.00 350.00
8 ---------------------------- 5,150.00 5,980.00 830.00
9 ----------------- 5,422.50 5,455.50 33.00
10 ------------------- 5,422.50 5,455.50 33.00
11 ---------------------------- 5,487.50 5,455.50 (32.00)
12 ---------------------------- 5,487.50 5,455.50 (32.00)
The above illustration indicates that the maximum benefits under
a restricted stock option will be derived where the second variable is
the greatest. The illustration is, of course, general and serves but to
point up the necessity for a realistic estimate of the circumstances
surrounding each prospective stock option. Maximum benefits to both
corporation and executive can be accomplished by giving meticulous
attention to the probable facts of a prospective option and projecting




Treat Value of Option as Consideration
In the Smith case, the Supreme Court stated:
Since the Tax Court found that the market price of the stock on
the date of the option did not exceed the option price, it is evident
that its finding that the option was given as compensation for respon-
dent's services, had reference to the compensation to be derived from
exercise of the option after the anticipated advance in market price of
the stock."8
But the court in that case, though speaking at dictum, pointed out
that:
When the option is less than the market price of the property for
the purchase of which the option is given, it may have present value
and may be found to be itself compensation for services rendered.2
This dictum was followed in McNamara v. Commissioner." In that
case the option was granted at a price below the fair market value
of the stock. The option was freely assignable, and was exercisable
whether or not the grantee continued as an employee. The resolution
granting the option stated that the executive's compensation for the
year included the option. The corporation deducted and taxpayer
included the value of the option in their returns for the year. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the option itself
had a present value when granted, was intended as compensation, and
was in fact compensation. It seems rasonable to expect that the Mc-
Namara case will be followed where the following factors are estab-
lished:
1. That there are no restrictions within the option period upon the
assignment or exercise of the option.
2. That the option be granted at a price appreciably lower than the
fair market value of the stock at date of grant.
3. That evidence in the contemporary papers establishes the intent
of the parties that the option itself be compensation.
4. That the parties make an honest attempt to arrive at a fair
market value for the options and that such value be reported by
both parties as compensation.
Use of Stock. Warrants
Closely related to stock options are stock warrants. As the two are
"Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 179 (1945).
29 Commissioner v. Smith, supra note 28, at 181.
30210 F. 2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954).
(Vol. I11
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used with respect to employees the essential difference seems to be
that the employee purchases the warrant whereas the option is gen-
erally granted without a cash payment by the employee. Where the
price paid for the warrants equals their market value, an arm's length
transaction occurs. Where, however, the price paid for the warrants
is clearly below their market value, the transaction would seem to be
in essence the same as the grant of an option which has a fair market
value. Such, at any rate, is the result of Commissioner v. Stone's
Estate," in which taxpayer purchased warrants for less than their
value. In that case the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that upon a subsequent sale of the warrants taxpayer recognized
capital gain where the value of the warrants had increased. Again
there seems to be little reason for this case not to be followed if a
market value can be ascribed to the warrants with sufficient certainty
and the intent is made clear that the warrant itself is to be treated
as compensation.
Sale By Corporation of Restricted Stock
Another method which has been used with some success by tax
practitioners is the sale of stock by a corporation to its executives
which stock is subject to restrictions preventing its sale or requiring
resale to the corporation at some ascertainable amount, e.g., book
value, or capitalized earning value. The idea is that the restriction will
preclude a market value on the stock at the time of sale to the
executive. At a subsequent time the restrictions are removed and the
stock is sold or the stock is repurchased by the corporation at an
increased valuation. In both cases it is hoped that the full amount of
the gain will be treated as capital gain to the executive. There is
authority to uphold the desired treatment. Several cases have held
that restrictions upon stock prevent it from having an ascertainable
market value." A recent tax court case, Robert Lehman,'4 held that
the subsequent termination of such restrictions on stock which had
no fair market value when previously received for services is not
an event which gives rise to income for tax purposes. For the present,
the acquiescence of the Commmissioner on this points" seems to offer
some slight degree of shelter. The Treasury's position appears to be
"1 210 F. 2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954).
32Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
" Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481 (1936); Schuh Trading Co. v. Com-
missioner, 95 F. 2d 404 (7th Cir. 1938); Propper v. Commissioner, 89 F. 2d 617 (2d Cir.
1937); Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952).
3417 T.C. 652 (1951).
"5 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 5.
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less favorable, however, with the recent proposal of a regulation mak-
ing the removal of restrictions a taxable event."6 In connection with
the restrictions requiring repurchase by the corporation, there is also
authority to support the above practices. In Estate of Raymond T.
Marshall"7 a closely held corporation sold stock to an officer with
the requirement that it be resold to the company upon termination
of the officer's employment. The court held that upon resale the
officer realized captial gain."s It is suggested that such restrictions on
stock be used only when the surrounding facts indicate that the pro-
curing of more favorable tax treatment is not the sole purpose for
their use. Though the Lehman case itself would seem to support the
tax free withdrawal of restrictions at any time, it is submitted that
where the circumstances surrounding the stock grant and the sub-
sequent restriction withdrawal do not indicate any other bona fide
business purpose, a court will have little difficuly in finding the sub-
stance of the transaction to have been compensatory in nature and
assess ordinary income rates thereto. In such a case the failure of
the corporation to amend its return within the time prescribed can
render substantial tax loss to the corporation as well as the individual.
Gift
Though there are times when a corporation desires to issue its
stock gratuitously to an individual in appreciation for some act of the
latter, such situations are not within the scope of this discussion. We
are concerned only with the transfer of stock to an executive for
the purpose of making the executive an owner and with doing so
as economically as possible. The big question is, for tax purposes can
a gift of stock be made by a corporation to an executive for the pur-
pose of granting stock ownership to the executive? (Assume cor-
porate power to make the gift.) To the writer's knowledge, the ques-
tion has not been squarely presented to the courts. The Supreme Court
in the LoBue case indicated that any transfer by a corporation to an
executive must be either compensation or a gift. Thus, in theory, it
can be done. However, the courts have not readily found transfers
to be gifts where the payment by the corporation is in recognition
3 U.S. Treas. Reg. 1.421-6(b) (1) (proposed November 10, 1956).
8720 T.C. 979 (1953).
38Compare National Clothing Co. of Rochester, 23 T.C. 944 (1955). A closely held
corporation sold its stock to an employee under a restriction requiring either resale or cor-
poration's consent to sell. In year of repurchase the corporation deducted the difference
between the amount received for the stock and the amount paid to the employee on re-
purchase as compensation to the employee. The corporation contended that the entire ar-
rangement was compensatory and the court so held.
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of past services." Furthermore, "if services have been performed by
the recipients, it may well be said the presumption is that the pay-
ment is for the services and not a gift." It would seem, as a practical
matter, that the use of gifts for the purpose of granting ownership
to an executive is today of little value to the tax planner. In almost
all instances the executive has rendered past services to the employer.
In these instances a presumption of payment for these services auto-
matically arises. This presumption is of course open to rebuttal, but
is extremely difficult if not impossible to overcome. Where past
services have not been rendered, it is unusual to find a gift being
made which is not conditioned upon the future receipt of services.
Issue of Preferred Stock Dividend
Though this Comment is not designed to exhaust the field of
possibilities, a rather unique arrangement in corporate financing has
been suggested by one writer which illustrates how stock plans can
be tailored to particular fact situations. The situation presented in
the words of the writer is as follows:
.... (A) closely held corporation may have one class of stock out-
standing and a fairly small group of stockholders {who desire to give
younger executives a chance to buy stock which will cost very little
but which will give them an enhanced interest in future growth. In
such cases, it may seem desirable to issue a tax-free stock dividend of
preferred stock on common stock with a par value of the preferred
equal to the present worth of the company and the preferred dividend
equal to present earnings. This should have the effect of reducing the
common stock to a low value, though there may still be room for
argument with the Commissioner over the precise amount. Then the
existing stockholders could sell their common stock to employees at a
nominal price.4'
COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES
In order to facilitate our comparison of the alternatives presented,
it should be useful to determine for each alternative, as was done
earlier in our discussion of restricted stock options, the net consoli-
dated cost to the corporation and the executive in effecting a transfer
of corporate stock. The different costs can then be compared to
"' Held to be compensation in the following cases: Wallace v. Commissioner, 219 F. 2d
855 (5th Cir. 1955); Painter v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Tex. 1953). Held to
be a gift in the following cases: Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937); Blair v.
Rosseter, 33 F. 2d 286 (9th Cir. 1929).
40Wallace v. Commissioner, 219 F. 2d 855, 857 (5th Cir. 1955); see also Carragan v.
Commissioner, 197 F. 2d 246 (2d Cir. 1952).
4' Lyon, Employee Stock Purchase Arrangements, 31 TAXES 1021, 1029 (1953).
1957)
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
determine the most economical under each particular set of circum-
stances. The twelve basic fact situations presented in the section on
restricted stock options will be used for each alternative to the extent
that the facts are relevant to a particular alternative. In addition,
the following facts must be assumed:
1. That in connection with options having a market value, the
market value of the option (Smith's option) is equal to the difference
between the option price of the stock and the fair market value
of the stock.
2. That warrants having a fair market value of $500 are sold for
$200 and entitle the executive to buy for $5,000 stock having a
value at the date of issuance of the warrants of $5,000. That the
executive exercises the warrants when the stock is selling for $7,000
and subsequently sells it for $7,000. That in situations 9 through
12 the executive had a taxable income of $64,000 in the year he
purchased the warrants and a taxable income of $8,000 in the year
he sold the stock.
3. That in the sale of restricted stock the stock (having a fair
market value of $5,000 unrestricted) is sold under restrictions to the
executive for the same amount (as the Smith option) as in the basic
situations. That between the time of the executive's purchase and
sale the restrictions are removed. (Restrictions requiring repurchase
by the corporations are not considered.)
The net consolidated cost can be calculated in the same manner as
illustrated earlier in this Comment." On that basis the comparative
net consolidated costs of the scheduled alternatives for the twelve
basic situations are tabulated in Table A.
42 The form used earlier can be adapted to the present type of stock arrangements. As
an illustration, the computation of cost of stock warrants for situation I is set forth below:
Situation I
Cost to Corporation:
Value of stock and warrant at date of warrant issue .-$5,500
Proceeds from warrants .-.----------------- -------- -. 200
Proceeds from sale of stock under warrants ..............................--- 5,000
Tax deduction value of spread (52% rate) ----------...................------ 156
Value received by corporation .-...............---------- -- --- --------- 5,356
Net cost to corporation _________-_ -------... . .- --. --- 144
Cost to Executive:
Cost of w a200
Tax on spread (38% x $300) 114
Cost of stock on exercise of warrants..- 5,000
Capital gain tax on subsequent sale
(38% x 50% x $7,000 less $5,500) ----- 285
Net cost to executive ----. .-.... . ... 5,599
Net consolidated cost ........ $5,743
(Vol. I I
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A word of caution must be inserted about accepting the costs
calculated in Table A as final for all purposes. For instance, perhaps
the primary purpose of an option is to compensate the employee.
Obviously the consolidated cost of the option is in itself misleading.
If the type alternative which has the lowest net consolidated cost in
the particular situation has a relatively low cost to the corporation
and a relatively high cost to the individual, the goal of compensat-
ing the employee has not been accomplished. In order to compensate
the individual as fully as desired, a cash payment must be arranged.
The cost of making that cash payment must then be added to the net
consolidated cost of the option. This should be done for all the
alternatives where compensation is a major factor. The cost of
making a cash payment of compensation is calculated as follows:
Situation X Situation Y
Cost to corporation:
Amount of payment ------------------------------------ $100 $100
Tax deduction (52% rate) (52) (52)
Cost to corporation ------------------ 48 48
Cost to individual:
Cash received --------...----------- ..............---- -- --  (100) (100)
Tax on payment
(Rates of 38% and 65% resp.) -------------- 38 65
Cost to individual ---------------------------- (62) (35)
Net cost of payment --------------------------------- - - -  ($14) 13
(Parentheses indicate negative figures).
A glance at the above tabulation will indicate that one alternative
will not, so far as cost alone is concerned, be the best one for all
occasions. In determining which alternative is most advantageous for
his client, the attorney should determine with as much objectivity
as possible what the circumstances can reasonably be expected to be
on the significant dates involved. On the basis of those circum-
stances, cost estimates should be worked out, as above, for com-
parison and selection of the most economical alternative. The attorney
should then weigh the cost factor against the reliability factor, (i.e.,
the degree of reliance that the Commissioner or the courts will up-
hold the desired method) and select the alternative which has the
most favorable balance of these two.
CONCLUSION
Executive stock options have been and will continue to be an
important tool in corporate affairs. There is every reason to believe
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that they will continue to find large usage both for the purpose of
compensating and for the still important purpose of granting propri-
etary interests to corporate officers. Though the Supreme Court has
taken away the advantage of permitting the corporation to deduct the
value of proprietary options to the extent that this had in the past
been done, it is submitted that the effect of the Court's decision will
not be too adverse where corporations did not make a practice of
taking such a deduction for the value of proprietary options.
Despite the fact that the Court's decision appears questionable,
it is now the law. Tax planners must now consider the alternative
courses to the granting of proprietary options. There are several.
Many of the alternatives are either not yet fully sanctioned by the
courts, or are, though supported, not considered to be of such sterling
legal quality as to be above reversal of judicial attitude. The degree
of reliability which can be placed upon an alternative being upheld
in court is a major consideration in the selection of a method. This
factor should be carefully weighed against the cost factor to the
corporation and to the executive. It is believed that an attorney, in
executing these considerations, will be rendering a service to his
client, whether corporation or individual, which will find its fruits
in increased corporate efficiency and esprit de corps.
Edward R. Smith
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